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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW2
GIDEON'S TRUMPET. By Anthony Lewis. New York:
Random House. 1964. Pp. 262. $4.95.
GmEON's TRUMPET is a study in depth of the case of Gideon v.
Wainwright1 in which the United States Supreme Court held that
an indigent defendant in a state criminal prosecution has an unquali-
fied right to the appointment of counsel.
In August, 1961, Gideon was tried and convicted in a Florida
court of the felony of breaking into the Bay Harbor Poolroom in
Panama City, Florida, with the intent to commit a misdemeanor.
Unarguably indigent, his request for court-appointed counsel was
refused. Gideon's reply is classic proof of Holmes' proposition that
"ignorance is the best of law reformers.".2 "The United States Su-
preme Court," he told the court, "says I am entitled to be repre-
sented by counsel" (p. 10). Gideon was, of course, as wrong in this
statement as he was in contending, after reversal of his conviction,
that a new trial on the original charge would constitute double
jeopardy.' For Betts v. Brady,4 decided in 1942, had held that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the
states to appoint counsel for indigent defendants only where special
circumstances 5 would render the defendant's trial without counsel
fundamentally unfair. Counsel was unconditionally required only in
capital cases.6 Gideon's petitions for habeas corpus to the Florida
Supreme Court' and for certiorari to the Supreme Court claimed no
"special circumstances" and the crime of which he was convicted
was non-capital. Thus the order granting certiorari need hardly have
asked, as it did: "Should this Court's holding in Betts v. Brady...
1 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 78 (1881).
3 United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). The English practice, however, would
sustain Gideon's latter contention. Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23,
§ 4 (1)-(2); Regina v. Connelly, (1963) 3 WEEKLY L. R. 839, 847 (Crim.
App.) (dictum).
4 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
5 Including youth, illiteracy, mental deficiency, the defendant's prior experience
with criminal proceedings, and the complexity of the applicable law.
6 Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 674 (1948) (dictum); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52, 55 (1961). Several scholars found this dichotomy particularly indefen-
sible. See Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism and State Systems of Criminaljustice, 8 DE PAUL L. Rav. 213, 230-31 (1959); Kamisar Betts v. Brady Twenty
Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MrcH. L. Rnv.
219, 254-60 (1962).
7 Denied without opinion. Record, p. 47.
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be reconsidered?"" Three weeks later Gideon's motion for appoint-
ment of counsel, solicited by the Clerk's Office,9 was granted, and
Mr. Abe Fortas, of the Washington firm of Arnold, Fortas and
Porter, became Gideon's attorney.'"
About the time of these events, one may suppose, Gideon's case
came to the attention of Mr. Anthony Lewis, Supreme Court corre-
spondent for the New York Times and winner of two Pulitzer
Prizes. If he then contemplated using Gideon's case as a vehicle for
an examination of the role of the Supreme Court, he must have
been delighted with what his research revealed regarding Gideon and
his trial. Both were distinguished chiefly by their ordinariness; the
tale to be told lay elsewhere. Thus, GiDEON'S TRUMPET is only inci-
dentally the account of an embattled indigent's struggle and ultimate
triumph against overwhelming odds. True, Gideon gained his right
to counsel, a new trial, his freedom and a place in the sun in Vol-
ume 372 of the United States Reports. This is merely the frosting.
Mr. Lewis' contribution is the description, simply and accurately,
of the adversary and adjudicative processes by which the Supreme
Court decides fundamental questions of public policy. Gideon's role
is to illustrate and, at times, to dramatize this description.
Mr. Lewis must at times have felt that he had come down some-
where near the center of the "seamless web." The granting of
Gideon's petition requires an explanation of the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction and the Court's power to grant or withhold it. "The
claim that Gideon presented to the Supreme Court was, in sum, one
that the court could hear. Whether the court would hear it was an-
other and very different question" (p. 22). It also calls for, and
receives, a discussion of judicial review and the Court's power to
declare unconstitutional the laws and actions of other branches and
units of government (pp. 80-82). This discussion in turn prompts
an account of the continuing debate as to the propriety of the use
of that power, the meaning and role of "judicial restaint" (pp.
82-86).
Supreme Court review of Gideon's state court conviction also
raises the question of the weight of the "federalism" argument in
8 370 U.S. 908 (1962). Professor Kamisar, in reviewing this book, faults Mr. Lewis
for failing "to make plain that on the eve of Gideon, the Bets rule had been
eroded almost to the vanishing point." Kamisar, Book Review, 78 HARV. L. REv.
478, 480 (1964). Relying upon Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962),
he concludes that "once the Supreme Court took (Gideon's) ... case, the ques-
tion was not whether Gideon would win, but only how?"--whether by the over-'
ruling of Betts, or by the application of the "special circumstances" doctrine to
require counsel in Gideon's case. Kamisar, supra at 482.
9 To forestall the possibility, the chief deputy clerk's "recurrent nightmare, that
some prisoner will want to argue his own case," p. 46.
10 370 U.S. 932 (1962).
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constitutional adjudication and its manifestation in the perennial
dialogue regarding the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the
States." It is saying quite a lot to say that the conflicting viewpoints
are impartially reported (pp. 86-94). Supreme Court supervision of
state criminal procedure is traced from Moore v. Dempsey through
Mapp v. Ohio" to Fay v. Noia' and Douglas v. California," de-
cided the same day as Gideon v. Wainwright.
The special history of the Court's treatment of the right-to-counsel
issue receives more detailed scrutiny. Drawing heavily upon the
language of the opinions and contemporary comment, Mr. Lewis
sketches, with masterful simplicity, the development of the right to
counsel from Powell v. Alabama to the present (pp. 105-17).
From what has been said it is dear that GIDEON'S TRUMPET is an
excellent introduction for the non-lawyer to the judicial institution
in our governmental scheme,' but that fails adequately to explain
its review in this publication.
Of particular interest to the lawyer is the account" of the devel-
opment of petitioner Gideon's frontal assault on Betts v. Brady.
The first hurdle involved the propriety of mounting such an attack
at all, for if the trial transcript (not yet included in the record)
indicated the presence of Bettsian "special circumstances," Fortas
could not, in fairness to his client, jeopardize the latter's chance for
a reversal by reaching for a broader rule. On Fortas' request the
Court ordered the trial transcript included in the record (p. 128).
It showed, as the Court was to find, that "Gideon conducted his
defense about as well as could be expected from a layman.' "'
11 To which dialogue Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Gideon added a
new note. Observing that since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment tenjustices had at one time or another "felt that it protects from infringement by the
States the privileges, protections, and safeguards granted by the Bill of Rights,"
but had never "commanded a Court," he added, "and what we do today does not
foreclose the matter." 372 U.S. at 345-46.
Mr. Justice Douglas did claim victory on a related issue: that the fundamental
"rights protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment are not watered-down versions of what the Bill of Rights
guarantees." 372 U.S. at 347. On this latter point, and for a critical evaluation of
Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court, see Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The
"At' of Overruling, [1963] SuPREME COURT REVIEW 211, 271 n.337.
12 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
13 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
14 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
'15 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
16 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
17 "For alas, they know too little of that subject. American journalism, on the whole,
does a poor job of accurately reporting court-doings. Our lawyers have made little
effort to explain to the laymen, in intelligible terms, the workings of our judicial
system. The resultant public ignorance is deplorable." FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL
1 (1950).
18 Principally, Chapters Four, Nine and Eleven.
'9 372 U.S. at 337.
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Gideon's brief was the product of the efforts not only of Fortas
but of several other members of Arnold, Fortas and Porter. Through
their memoranda the reader is treated to a rare view of an impor-
tant but often obscure aspect of the appellate process. One witnesses
the evolution of petitioner's brief as the seeds of questions and ideas,
subjected to the germinative power of imagination and exhaustive
research, yield first memoranda and avenues for further study and
finally the assertive legal propositions that are the trademark of
appellate briefs. The irony of this outpouring of legal talent for the
cause of one whom the Constitution said needed no lawyer is mag-
nificent. Sole responsibility for Florida's brief fell to a single assist-
ant attorney general, youthful (twenty-six) Bruce R. Jacob. On the
state that had pitted Gideon against an experienced prosecutor, the
tables were neatly turned.
Save for those unflinchingly devoted to the underdog, the account
of the states' response to Jacob's plea for help, in the form of
amicus curiae briefs, is delightful. Not only did he enlist but two
states-Alabama and North Carolina-to his cause, but his letter
engendered a reaction, sparked by Minnesota and Massachusetts,
that grew into a brief amicus curiae signed by the attorneys general
of twenty-three states, all urging that Betts v. Brady be overruled
(p. 146-50).
The basis for the Betts decision had been that although the ap-
pointment of counsel for indigent defendants in federal criminal
courts was required by the Sixth Amendment," it was not one of
those "fundamental rights" of due process made obligatory upon
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The federal system re-
quired that the states be as nearly free as possible from control by
the national government in their administration of criminal justice.
Fortas knew that if he was to succeed he had to rationalize the
appointment of counsel in state criminal proceedings with the de-
mands of federalism. His solution was to turn the federalism argu-
ment on its head. Far from protecting the states from intervention by
the national government in the control of their criminal procedure,
the Betts doctrine, calling for a case by case appraisal of "special
circumstances" that often were not apparent until after conviction,
had become a prime source of such intervention (pp. 126-27, 171-
72). Every case in which an uncounseled defendant was convicted
became an opportunity for federal-state abrasion, and the Supreme
Court had not failed to find "special circumstances" in any case
coming before it since 1950 (pp. 114, 172).
20 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
1965]
SAN DIEGO LAW" REVIEW[
Although it is not properly within the scope of this review of
Mr. Lewis' work, I cannot withhold the comment that Mr. Fortas'
admittedly compelling argument simply begs the question. Certainly
federal-state conflicts can be eliminated by adoption of a uniform
national rule.2' This is not, however, a solution to such conflicts,
but a negation of them. Logically extended, it would resolve the
problems of the federal system by supplanting it with a unitary one.
Moreover, even in its limited application, its effect is less to elimi-
nate such conflicts than to shift the arena in which they arise. Case
by case concern for whether the record exhibits those "special cir-
cumstances" required under Betts becomes case by case concern with
whether the trial of a particular "petty offense" requires counsel (p.
173); or whether the defendant effectively waived his right;22 or
whether the right had attached at the time of the alleged denial.2"
In the first introduction of his reader to the Supreme Court, Mr.
Lewis sounds a theme to which he is to return in the most important
chapter of the book. The theme is that "'however much one could
criticize the Supreme Court of the United States, it endured and
deserved its place in our political structure because it did its own
work.'" (p. 29)."2 Having recounted the processes that culminated
in the Court's reversal of Gideon's conviction, and having managed,
in one succinct chapter, to describe in detail the federal, state and
private reception of the new principle therein announced (pp. 191-
207), the author addresses himself to the larger question of the
justification of these examples of the Supreme Court's power. "Why
should nine appointed lawyers play so large a role in a country that
calls itself a democracy? Is it appropriate that the Supreme Court,
rather than elected legislators, should reform the country's criminal
procedure or its race relations?" (p. 211). What follows is as
thoughtful a discussion as can be found anywhere in the popular
writings about the Court. He finds partial, but negative, justification
for judicial power in its "function as a forum for those without a
political voice" (p. 212); the indigent, the imprisoned, the disfran-
chised, the minority. But, "the great role of the Supreme Court can
only be justified, in the end, by the process it brings to bear on
public problems-by the distinctive characteristics of the judicial
process" (p. 213).
21 Just as President Johnson's proposed "changes in the Taft-Hartley Act including
Section 14-B" (the enabling section for state "Right-to-Work" laws) will "reduce
conflicts that for several years have divided Americans in various states." N.Y.
Times, Jan. 5, 1965, p. 16, col.6 (city ed.).
22 Cf. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
23 See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964).
24 Quoting Justice Brandeis.
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.Chief among these characteristics recurs the notion that the Court
does its own work and each justice bears responsibility for what is
done. "Why this characteristic of the judicial process is important
is hard to explain, but anyone who has ever tried to grope his way
through the faceless bureaucracy of government and pin down
responsibility for a mistake will understand" (p. 213). It is not
simply the fact of individual responsibility, but what the justices
are responsible for-a fair hearing and a principled opinion-that
distinguishes the Court's work. "What is given to the justices is the
opportunity not to command but to persuade. The ...ability to
perceive great moral truths and to articulate them in a way that
excites the imagination of the citizen . . . is as important to the
Supreme Court as the power of sword or purse to the other branches
of government" (pp. 219-20).
The epilogue recounts Gideon's retrial and resultant acquittal.
The expected anticlimax is considerably enlivened by Gideon's
quixotic refusal to be represented by two Florida Civil Liberties
Union attorneys. Their report, subtitled "How the Florida Civil
Liberties Union Wasted $300, and How Two Attorneys Each Trav-
eled over 1200 Miles and Killed an Otherwise Perfectly Enjoyable
July Fourth Weekend," philosophically concludes: "In the future
the name 'Gideon' will stand for the great principle that the poor
are entitled to the same type of justice as are those who are able to
afford counsel. It is probably a good thing that it is immaterial and
and unimportant that Gideon is something of a 'nut' . . ." (pp.
227-28).
GIDEON's TRUMPET is not contemporary legal history: 5 it makes
no pretense at a critical evaluation of the political and social, as well
as constitutional, problems described within its covers. It is an accu-
rate, impartial and highly readable account of the judicial process.
John M. Junker*
25 See Murphy, Book Review, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 900 (1964).
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington.
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